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PATENTING MICROORGANISMS: WORKING THE BUGS
OUT OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEPOSITARY
AUTHORITY
Mark Twain once wrote: "A country without good patent laws
is just a crab and can't travel any way but sideways and
backways."' If his statement has any merit, the world is but a para-
lytic crab with respect to the modernistic era of genetic
engineering.2
Genetic experimentation has become an international com-
monplace.3 Developments in genetic research have already pro-
vided society with dynamic technological advances.
Pharmaceutical laboratories, for example, have developed vaccines
from genetically altered microorganisms which have helped dimin-
ish many types of poultry, bovine and porcine diseases.4 Microor-
ganisms have been created which synthesize human insulin.5
Future experiments are predicted to accomplish even greater ad-
vances.6 Developments through genetic experimentation undoubt-
edly will provide society with alternative fuel supplies, chemicals to
1. Quoted in Whale, Patents and Genetic Engineering 14 INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 93
(1982). It was Judge Rich of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) speaking
through the United States Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 206
U.S. Pat. Q. 193 (,1980) who saved the U.S. patent te m btem eing "it a crah" with
respect to products of new technology. Id
2. Teschemacher, Patentability of Microorganismsper se, 13 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP.
& COPYRIGHT L. 27, 28 (1982).
3. After World War II, the technology for producing penicillin and streptomycin by
fermentation was introduced by the United States and caused revolutionary developments in
Japan. Today over twenty antibiotics invented by Japanese scientists are in production in
this country and the microbial strain used is the key to each product or process. Hayashi, .4
Japanese Perspective on Patenting Microorganisms, 7 AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J. 306 (1979).
4. These experiments have international significance. Many of the major pharmaceu-
tical industries derive a substantial portion of their profits through international sales. The
economic benefits of providing a uniform international patent system would be attractive to
these industries. See Reinbold, Bacteria Tycoons Start a Real Growth Industry, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 3, 1980, at E8, col. 3.
5. See Aharonowitz & Cohen, The Microbiological Production ofPharmaceuticals, Sci.
AM., Sept. 1981, at 151.
6. "[One] main reason for the excitement is recent advances in identifying genes called
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aid in food production and, possibly, a cure for cancer.7
The laws regulating and protecting these experiments and their
subsequent inventions continue, however, to sputter at an inchoate
stage. Although a few countries have enacted statutes that recog-
nize the patentability of man-made microorganisms, there is little
uniformity within the patenting process.8 The Budapest Treaty was
conceived in 19779 to help create some uniformity. I0 The Treaty
established a system of depositaries" for the collection and mainte-
nance of microbial products, which are the subject of inventions,
where patent protection has been sought. 2 Recently, several mem-
ber nations have expressea discomfort with the safety and function-
ing of the system of depositaries. Some countries have gone so far
as to enact regulatory laws which undermine one of the original
objectives of the Treaty. '
3
This Comment will explore the patent laws governing man-
made life forms and discuss two major areas of international con-
oncogenes-that appear to be involved in producing cancer." San Diego Union, Feb. 20,
1983, at Al, col. 4.
7. A cancer cell is a cell that has lost the ability to control its growth and division. It is
now known that viruses cause this unregulated division. Many researchers hope that experi-
ments with interferon, a chemical derived from humans with the aid of microorganisms, will
yield a product that will interrupt the growth of these cancer cells. J. WATSON, MOLECULAR
BIOLOGY OF THE GENE 684 (1977).
8. See Whale, supra note 1, at 106.
9. Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposits of Microorga-
nisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure, April 28, 1977, T.I.A.S. No. 9768 [hereinafter
cited as Budapest Treaty]. The Budapest Treaty was subsequently amended in 1981. As of
March 1, 1982, the signatories were: Bulgaria, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Hun-
gary, Japan, Liechtenstein, Philippines, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States
of America and the USSR. The following countries are likely future members: Australia,
Austria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland; Democratic Republic of Germany, In-
donesia, Italy, Luxemburg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Se-
negal, Sweden and Yugoslavia. W. BIGGART, B. BRUNSUOLD, D. CONLIN, I. KILEY & R.
SCHWAAB, GENETIC ENGINEERING WORLDWIDE THE LAW AND BUSINESS 14-15 (1982) [here-
inafter cited as PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, IlNC.].
Editor's note.- As ofpublication, the Budapest Treaty has not been listed in any other treaty
service.
10. This Treaty will be discussed at length later in this Comment; see infra text § Il1. At
this point it should be noted that prior to the enactment of this treaty, many of the major
countries established their own laws with regard to patenting microorganisms; see also Led-
erer, A Perspective on Patenting Microorganisms, 7 AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J. 288 (1980).
11. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9. The depositaries are collection laboratories which
contain facilities designed to store microorganisms; see also infra text accompanying notes
129-145.
12. See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 12.
13. Germany and Korea presently restrict exportation of patented microorganisms. In
Germany the patent applicant has a legal right to prohibit third parties from removing mi-
crobial samples from territories covered by German patent law. Id. at 80-81.
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cern: the dangers of uncontrolled transportation of potentially
harmful microorganisms; and the suppressive effect on interna-
tional patenting caused by sovereign supervision over the transpor-
tation of microbial inventions.' 4 A cursory examination of
domestic and international patent laws will illustrate the lack of
uniformity of the various patent systems. The unique nature of the
patenting of life forms will then be discussed. This inquiry will
establish the need for uniformity in patenting man-made life forms.
A detailed discussion of the Budapest Treaty will follow, and
arguments for and against the depositary system will be addressed.
Those opposed can cite the Paris Union Convention15 as interna-
tional precedent. 16 Moreover, these same nations assert sovereign
scrutiny over the importation and exportation of patented life
forms is essential to prevent international infringement, maintain
domestic mores and ensure worldwide safety. The nations favoring
the system maintain that international depositaries are essential to
encourage communication of novel information.' 7
Imaginative and invaluable products are being discovered
every day. A proper system of international patent protection is
essential to purvey the suitable incentive to reach these goals. Au-
thorities must therefore create a more appropriate international
patenting system for man-made microorganisms. In conclusion,
provisions for an amplified treaty, which could alleviate many of
the concerns presented, will be proposed. A revised treaty should
put Mark Twain's crab back on course.
I. THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEMS
A. Origins
Historically, legal minds have recognized the inherent "right"
of originators to at least receive credit when others utilize their
14. See infra text accompanying notes 238-269.
15. See Landau, Multinational Corporations and Lesser Developed Countries-Foreign
Investment, Transfer of Technology, and the Paris Union Convention: Caveat Investor, 5 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 105, 136 (1980).
16. "The international obligation of countries that have approved a treaty to give inter-
nal effect to its provisions is a prerequisite for the fruitful and almost global cooperation
among the 88 states of differing political and economic structures which, today, adhere to the
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property concluded in Paris in 1883 and ulti-
mately revised in Stockholm in 1967." Gansser, Violations of the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, 63 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 138 (1980).
17. See infra text and accompanying notes 57-63.
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ideas.'" An idea which spawns a marketable product provides a
valuable contribution to society. These originators deserve to be
rewarded for their contributions.' 9 Moreover, worthwhile ideas
benefit society only when the results of the ideas are made widely
available.2" Once available, the new information will increasingly
enable others to invent more novel products.2'
Patent law was the progeny of that area of property law which
recognized the need to govern both the incentives for and the availa-
bility of new ideas. 22 The function of the law is to provide an in-
centive for experimenters to develop ideas which benefit society.23
'Wlien tLe law 'ais, new ideas are iost or never even :"born." Ai aw
that does not properly protect an inventor's property right hardly
encourages the development of subsequent ideas.
24
In the United States, patent law was the creation of Con-
gress.25 Other countries, under the authority of their constitutions,
similarly have created statutory law designed to encourage experi-
mentation.26 Most countries accomplish this task by granting the
experimenters an exclusive right to their inventions for a limited
18. Ideas in and of themselves are not patentable subject matter. It is the resulting
product of that idea which may be legally protected. OFF. TECH. ASSESSMENT REP. ch. 12, at
237 (1981).
19. The U.S.A. Patent Act of 1793, authored by Thomas Jefferson, embodied the philos-
ophy that ingenuity should receive liberal encouragement. 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFER-
SON 75-76 (Washington ed. 1871).
20. The most common element of the patent statutes around the world is enablement.
This means that most countries would not recognize a product as being patentable unless the
invention's full description enables others with similar skills to reproduce it. PATENT RE-
SOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 136-37.
21. The term "inventing around the invention" is often used to explain how many novel
products are created through improvement of prior art. See OFF. TECH. ASSESSMENT REP.,
supra note 18, at 244.
22. Patent law was the legal system designed to provide government-sanctioned reme-
dies and a means to protect inventors' rights in their unique contributions to society. I.
KAYTON, KAYTON ON PATENTS I-1 (1980).
23. G. COPLEIN, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PATENT LAW 31 (1980).
24. There is a great expense in developing ideas into novel products. For an overview
of the procedures involved, see B. LANDIS, PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARKS AND TRADE
SECRETS FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL AND GENERAL PRACTITIONERS 92 (1979).
25. The federal patent statutes are derived from the United States Constitution. Article
1, § 8 reads: "The Congress shall have [the] power... to promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 57 (1978).
26. G. FLONZ, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 9 (1975). Accord-
ing to Article 73, § 9, "[tlhe Federation of the Federal Republic of West Germany shall have
the exclusive power to legislate . . . industrial property rights, copyrights and publishers'
rights..." Id. at 35.
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period of time.27 During this period, the experimenter's new inven-
tion becomes published and accessible to the public as long as that
person receives compensation from anyone who uses, makes or
sells the invention.28 Compensation is generally received in the
form of royalties supplied by the company which utilizes the inven-
tion to create other marketable and unique products. 29 These pro-
cedures, however, only apply to those products which are
patentable.
B. Patentable Subject Matter
Patent statutes in most nations require four essential criteria in
order to consider an invention patentable.3" First, an invention
must be capable of classification as a machine, process, manufac-
ture or composition of matter.31 Most countries have found prod-
ucts of nature, scientific principles and mathematical formulas to be
unpatentable since such discoveries are only derived from preexis-
tent entities.32  In other words, the invention must have the attri-
bute of utility.3 3 Second, the invention must be novel: new and
useful. The requirements for novelty do not exist under United
States law34 if (a) the inventor is not the applicant for the patent, (b)
27. See OFF. TECH. ASSESSMENT REP., supra note 18, at 238. A patent gives the creator
the right to exclude all others from making, using or selling his invention for the statutory
period of time. In the United States the statutory period is 17 years; in West Germany the
duration is 18 years. See also B. SINNOT, 2C WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE art. 3, at 2
(1982).
28. See OFF. TECH. ASSESSMENT REP., supra note 18, at 238; see also 35 U.S.C. § 101
(1976).
29. Royalties can be set in a large variety of ways. The following are some of the most
common: percentage on sales, fixed sum per unit sold, straight scale versus varying scale,
fully paid-up license, use royalty, entire market value rule and a minimum royalty rule. L.
PRETTY, PATENT LAW FOR THE BUSINESS LAWYER 45 (1981).
30. G. SPENCER, INTERNATIONAL PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 44 (1973).
31. In Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609 (1887), the United States Supreme Court
defines a manufacture or composition of matter to mean a product of human ingenuity "hav-
ing a distinctive name, character and use." Id. at 615.
32. The laws of nature, physical phenomena and abstract ideas have been held not to be
patentable in the U.S. Therefore, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant
found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not have pat-
ented his celebrated E=mc 2 , nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such dis-
coveries are "manifestations of. . . nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none."
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 33 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
33. Ideas have utility only when they are fully developed. "One may not patent a mere
idea, although novel and useful; an idea must be reduced to practice and practical methods
of making and using it must be described so as to enable the public to use the invention."
Wayne v. Humble Oil Refining Co., 175 F. 2d 230, 233 (1949).
34. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). In France, in order for an invention to be considered novel,
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the invention was previously known or used by others in either the
United States or other countries, or (c) the invention's description
was previously in a foreign patent or publication.35 Third, the in-
vention must not be obvious to one skilled in the arts.36 Obvi-
ousness can be determined by considering the differences between
previously patented inventions and the design claimed for protec-
tion. Fourth, the description of the invention must enable duplica-
tion by reasonably skilled individuals in the same area of
technology.
37
Although these four elements are required in many of the ma-
jor c,.u iases, vanatioris du exis. -- For example, the dednition of
"patentable subject matter" under the European Patent Conven-
tion39 is limited to one sentence:4" "European patents shall be
the invention must not be included in the "state of the art." See G. SPENCER, supra note 30,
at 63.
35. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). The West German patent system is composed of two
branches: The Patentgesetz, the formal patent law, and the Gebrauchsmustergesets, the
petty patent system. The Patentgesetz grants long term monopolies to inventions which ful-
fill stringent requirements. The Gebrauchsmustergesets grants short term monopolies to
products which satisfy less strict novelty requirements. The formal system has novelty re-
quirements similar to the United States patent system. The Gebrauchsmustergesets requires
the invention to be novel in arrangement, embodiment or device. See E. STRINGHAM, PAT-
ENTS AND GEBRAUCHSMUSTER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 (1935). Novelty of arrangement
(Anordnumg) distinguishes the originality of the spatial arrangement of the parts of the in-
vention. Novelty of embodiment (Gestalung) refers to inventiveness of form, material, or
surface. Novelty of the device (Vorrichtung) takes into consideration the novelty of arrange-
ment and embodiment factors. Id.
36. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). The U.S. standard for nonobviousness has been criticized
for being inflexible. No degrees or levels of obviousness are recognized by the U.S. statute.
The Federal Republic of Germany's requirement of nonobviousness under the Patentgesetz
and the Gebrauchsmustergesets has some flexibility. Germany's statute permits a dual stan-
dard of recognition. Under the obviousness criteria, Erfindungshoehe mandates that the in-
vention manifest substantial improvement over prior art. See Busse, Probleme des
Gebrauchsmusterrechts, 54 GROR 123, 124 (1952).
37. In West Germany the requirement is that the invention must be susceptible of ex-
ploitation in industry and trade. G. SPENCER, supra note 30, at 63, 159; see also Blumcraft of
Pittsburgh v. U.S., 372 F.2d 1014, 178 Ct. Cl. 798 (1967).
38. For the purpose of expediency, the reader is asked to consider these four elements as
being the requirements for patentability of the countries discussed in this Comment. A com-
pilation of many different countries' requirements would confuse the reader's understanding
of why life forms can be considered patentable. See SPENCER, supra note 30, at 63.
39. Convention on the Grant of European Patents and Attached Annexes and Draft
Guidelines [hereinafter cited as EPC], also known as the Munich Patent Convention, adopted
in Munich, Oct. 5, 1973, entered into force Oct. 7, 1977. J. SINNOTT, 2L WORLD PATENT
LAWS 1 (1978). The EPC was designed to grant an option to worldwide inventors for ob-
taining foreign patents beyond simply filing separate applications in each country. It should
be noted that the EPC was created to ease the problems involved in patenting inaminate
objects in foreign countries. This Comment deals with the Budapest Treaty which was
designed to eliminate the problems in patenting "live" inventions abroad. See Winner, Prac-
Vol. 14
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granted for any inventions which are new, susceptible of industrial
application and which indicate an inventive step.'
The requirements for protecting inventions traditionally ap-
plied only to inanimate objects.42 Within the last decade, however,
many countries have recognized that certain genetically engineered
microorganisms are also patentable. 43  The current international
trend favors the patentability of various life forms.
C. The Patentability of Living Organisms
Although several countries contemplated the patentability of
microorganisms as early as the 1920's, it was not until the late
1970's that a few major countries determined certain life forms to
be capable of legal protection by patents.44 West Germany, Japan
and Great Britain were among the first countries which regarded
microorganisms as per se4 5 patentable.46
The United States has reached a similar conclusion. In 1980,
the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty47 held that a live,
man-made microorganism could qualify as patentable subject mat-
tical Effects of the Patent Cooperation Treaty and the European Patent Convention on Domestic
Technology Management and Patent Practice, 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 419 (1980).
40. EPC, supra note 39, art. 52:1.
41. "The EPC definition is extraordinarily general and broad. Rather than providing a
clear, positive definition of patentable subject matter, the EPC takes the approach of narrow-
ing this broad definition by explicitly specifying negative restrictions thereto." PATENT RE-
SOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 38.
42. "No doubt, when 100 years ago the various patent systems were created, those who
drafted the patent laws did not have the intention to provide for inventions which related to
anything alive. Neither did they have the -intention to exclude such iventons; it is just
because they did not contemplate living matter, because the patent system was primarily
intended to serve industry and in those days industry did not comtemplate living matter as
part of its concerns." Lederer, supra note 10, at 296.
43. See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 137.
44. In a decision concerning a patent on a process for the manufacture of a medicament
useful against tuberculosis and made up of the cultivation of tortoise, the German Patent
Office, upheld by the Reichsgericht (the governing body in Germany), did not reject the
patentability of a biological process made up of living matter. Lederer, supra note 10, at 289.
45. "Per se" means, in this situation, that the product will be accepted as long as the
Patent Examining Office determines that it is novel, nonobvious and useful.
Up until about 1979, it was considered that microorganisms per se could not be
patented in Japan, and the Examination Standards for Inventions of the Applied
Microbiological Industry promulgated by the Japanese Patent Office in 1970 stated
that microorganisms were unpatentable because they are not industrially
applicable.
PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 97.
46. See Whale, supra note 1, at 107.
47. 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
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ter in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 101.48 The United States
Supreme Court based its decision on the fact that Chakrabarty's
microorganism could be classified as a "manufacture" or "composi-
tion of matter" within the meaning of this statute. 49  The Court
ruled that a live, genetically engineered microorganism could there-
fore fulfill the requirements of utility, novelty, obviousness and
enablement.50
The decision in Chakrabarty had a profound effect throughout
the world.5 Many other countries have subsequently determined
that certain man-made microorganisms are patentable.52 Microor-
ganisms can now be patented in Austria, Belgium, Great Britain,
Italy, Israel, Japan, The Netherlands, Sweden and West Ger-
many.53 The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia allow a new strain
of microorganisms to be protected by an inventor's certificate,
54
provided that the microorganism is capable of use in an industrial
process. The European Patent Office55 has not directly ruled on the
patentability of microorganisms, but undoubtedly will follow the
precedent set by these countries.56 Despite the number of countries
which recognize microorganisms as patentable, the lack of interna-
48. See supra text accompanying notes 31-37.
49. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308.
50. Chakrabarty, while employed by the General Electric Company, succeeded through
the use of recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid by altering the genetic makeup of some of the
bacteria of the genus Pseudomonas. The altered bacteria could degrade crude oil into a food
source for marine life, therefore, the product became a unique way of removing oil spills.
Prior to Chakrabarty's work, it was found that although various species of Pseudomonas
could degrade one out of the four components of hydrocarbons which make up crude oil, the
species could not co-exist and therefore would not successfully degrade all the components of
crude oil. Id.
51. Clark, Philosopher's Paradise: Should a Microorganism the Product of a Microbiolo-
gist be Patentable, 4 AUCKLAND U. L. REV. 129, 143 (1981).
52. Schlosser, Patenting Biological Inventions, 12 U. TOL. L. REV. 925 (1982); see also
PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 136-37.
53. See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 136-37.
54. Schlosser, supra note 52, at 933-44. Communist countries issue inventor's certifi-
cates rather than patents when protecting inventions. The State, not the inventor, owns the
novel product in these countries. Id.
55. The European Patent Office receives the patent applications of inventors of the na-
tions belonging to the European Patent Convention. The European Patent Office determines
whether an application falls under the category of patentable subject matter. A patent search
is also performed at this point. Once found patentable, the application is transmitted to
designated member-countries, who require translation into their own languages and thereaf-
ter issue separate national patents. See Winner, supra note 39, at 420.
56. The German Federal Supreme Court (BGH) in the 1975 Backerhefe (Baker's Yeast)
case, having precedent that biology formed part of the technology for which patent protec-
tion was available, ruled that microorganisms were patentable. See 1975 GRUR 430; GIIC
207 (1975). However, the question whether and to what extent microorganisms can be pro-
Vol. 14
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tional uniformity of patent procedures is prevalent. The reasons
for patenting man-made microorganisms demonstrates the argu-
ments supporting increased uniformity.
D. The Necessity of Patenting Man-Made Microorganisms
The primary objective of a patent system is to stimulate prod-
uct innovation 7.5  A proper legal system stimulates the expression
of novel ideas through three methods. First, the potential for exclu-
sive commercialization provides an incentive for the inventor to en-
dure the long, frustrating and expensive process of discovering and
developing a product from the stages of research through marketa-
bility. 8 The inventor goes through great expense and effort in or-
der to develop the product and to convince others of its unique
value to society.59
Second, the new knowledge disclosed in a patent application
allows other experimenters to improve and to develop the patented
product by "inventing around the invention."6 ° A patented inven-
tion not only makes the expression of a marketable idea available
to the public, but also encourages the creation of other ideas which
envision modified versions of this product of even greater value. 6'
The notion behind encouraging the publication of novel products is
to allow others access to new and useful information. Once the in-
formation is available, researchers can incorporate the concepts
into their own experiments and create even better products.62
Third, the patent system saves the time and money of the in-
ventor's competitors. A patent system grants an exclusive property
right in the inventor for a limited period of time.63 This property
tectedper se is still largely unresolved in the international legal practice. See Teschemacher,
supra note 2, at 27, 30.
57. See Churchwell, Patent Law-Subject Mailer Patentability-Computers and Mathe-
matical Formulas, 14 INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 305 (1982).
58. See E. PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF AN INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 8 (1951
& reprint 1973).
59. The inventor cannot isolate himself from the world of politics. OFF. TECH. ASSESS-
MENT REP., supra note 18, at 244.
60. Id. at 243.
61. Former President Jimmy Carter stated, "[l]nnovation in the United States badly
needs stimulation." Thereafter he made plans to spur innovation, which included, in part,
enhancing the transfer of information and strengthening the patent system. Watson, The
Patentability of Living Organisms, 20 AM. Bus. L.J., 93, 101 (1982).
62. See OFF. TECH. ASSESSMENT REP., supra note 18, at 244.
63. The term "exclusive" is misleading. Patent law encourages publication of ideas so
that others can use them. However, the law excludes those who do not compensate the in-
ventor. Id.
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right entitles only the holder to reap the benefits of a marketed in-
vention. Once a patent is granted, the invention becomesprior art
64
to all subsequent products which lack a sufficient degree of inven-
tiveness.65  Subsequent inventors would be dissuaded from
redeveloping prior art as such acts would constitute infringement.
Inventors would redirect their resources into other areas of re-
search.66 Furthermore, both the individual and society will benefit.
The time and energy of some of the world's best minds would be
streamlined into areas of research in dire need of inventive work.
67
A patent system is therefore essential to the protection of inan-
zinaie objects. any afgue that the patenting 0'lividcrg
would have similar positive effects, in addition to providing ade-
quate protection to the applicants. 68 Alternatively, some argue that
other types of legal theories would provide superior protection.69
The consensus among intellectual property experts is that the
patent system will prove to be of major assistance to genetic re-
search. 71 Microorganisms or other man-made life forms deserve
the same type of legal protection as chemical compounds.7 Many
countries currently recognize the patentability of chemical products
provided that the invention satisfies the requirements of utility,
novelty, nonobviousness and enablement.72 Experimentations in
chemistry, although distinct, parallel those in biology in that both
64. For a detailed discussion on the subjects that constitute "prior art," see Chisum,
Foreign Activity. Its Effect on Patentability under United States Law, I I INT'L REV. INDUS.
PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 26 (1980); Chisum, Sources of PriorArt in Patent Law, 52 WASH. L.
REV. 1 (1976). The general rule as to priority of invention is that priority goes to the inventor
who first reduced the embodiment of the invention to practice.
65. Fields v. Schuyler, 472 F.2d 1304, 1305 (1972).
66. See Collins, The Significance of Inventorshio Determinationsfor Foreign and Domes-
tic Inventors, 7 AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J 117 (1979).
67. Whale, supra note 1, at 108.
68. See Bloom, Designer Genes and Patent Law: .4 Good Fit, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
1041 (1981).
69. An alternative to the patent system is the protection gained through trade secrecy.
Unlike patents, trade secrets protect an inventor's new product not through compensation,
but through censorship of the novel information. This procedure may prevent infringement,
but it also prevents the distribution of new information to society. See Rose, Protecting
Trade Secrets 130 PRAc. L. INST. 9, 11-12 (1981).
70. Talbot, Introduction to Recombinant-DNA Research Development and Evolution of
NIH Guidelines, and Proposed Legislation, 12 U. TOL. L. REV. 805, 806 (1981).
71. At the present time some countries recognize the patentability of chemical com-
pounds created by microorganisms and yet refuse to grant patent protection to the mircroor-
ganism itself. These countries include Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Denmark, Norway,
Finland and Spain. PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 137.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 31-37.
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use many of the same materials, techniques and theories.73 Fur-
thermore, product claims are the only means of protecting all forms
of manufacture and use.74 Providing the very best protection
would arguably encourage full disclosure by potential patent appli-
cants.75 Identical products have been derived through different
methods.76 Unless the product is protected, an inventor would not
have any recourse against others who produce substantially similar
products by different methods.77 Likewise, patents could be ob-
tained even if a product encompasses prior art78 as long as it is
produced by a different method. Product protection would prevent
this problem.79
The third supporting authority embodies international policy
which encourages uniformity in the patent laws.8" The general
trend of international jurisprudence has favored the patentability of
microorganisms.8' The benefits of making patent information in-
ternationally available would be defeated unless most countries
were to follow this trend. 2 Inventors would be deterred from filing
in countries not following the trend of providing protection to the
actual life form.
Finally, without patent protection of the microbial product,
sample submission83 would not occur.84 In many countries, full dis-
73. The growth and reproduction of microorganisms involves many chemical reactions.
Microorganisms commonly produce alcohols, acids and aldehydes as byproducts. See J.
WATSON, supra note 7, at 43.
74. OFF. TECH. ASSESSMENT REP., supra note 18, at 24.
75. The following example is an abbreviated list of some of the potentially patentable
microbial products: new microorganisms, processes for making the new microorganisms,
biologically pure cultures of microorganisms, new and old products from new microorga-
nisms, new uses for products from new microorganisms, isolated genes and gene sequences
on other DNA subunits, synthetic genes, plasmids containing inserted genes, fermentation
processes for growing new microorganisms, and new enzymes and reagents and their uses in
making microorganisms. Whale, supra note 1, at 93.
76. Hayashi, supra note 3, at 316.
77. The clause "substantially similar" is used more often in copyright law. A product is
classified as substantially similar when it lacks a sufficient amount of creativity. In patent
law the product must show a "sufficient degree of inventiveness." See text accompanying
note 65.
78. Whale, supra note 1, at 104.
79. See Behringer, Microorganism Patents, 63 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 128 (1981).
80. See Winner, supra note 39, at 419.
81. Work in genetic engineering is taking place overseas. This work originated with the
sponsorship of U.S. companies. These countries also follow the U.S. restrictions on DNA
research. Hayashi, supra note 3, at 306.
82. Id.
83. Sample submission means the submission of a pure culture of the microorganism.
A pure culture is one that is composed of entirely one genus and species of an organism.
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closure of microorganism is best served when the product is submit-
ted to the proper authority.85 Accessibility to the sample gives the
user the ability to reproduce the microorganism without undertak-
ing the expensive process of development. 6
The conclusions provided by these arguments do not reveal the
complete picture. There is authority against providing patents for
man-made microorganisms.87 The major arguments are threefold.
The first group opposed to such a system contends that a patent
would not provide sufficient protection for unique organisms. 88 In-
fringements of these inventions could be difficult to detect.89 When
an appiication is filed, the patent system generally requires the best
mode9 ° of disclosure. Sample submission would probably fulfill
this requirement. 9' A person to whom a sample is released could,
through genetic experimentation, alter or mutate the genetic make-
up into an arguably noninfringing but useful species. 92 Thus, the
original patent owner might not be compensated if the mutation
goes undetected. 93 Furthermore, in many countries, the burden of
proving infringement is often difficult to overcome.9" This might
influence the patent owners not to undergo the expensive process of
84. Schlosser, supra note 52, at 944.
85. See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 136-37.
86. Most microorganisms can be easily reproduced if a viable sample is passed to some-
one with the proper instructions for propagation. The process of altering the DNA sequence,
however, can be quite technical, expensive and difficult unless the scientist is familiar with
the organism and the type of experiment that is to be performed. Id. at 45.
87. See Zimmerman, .4 Case .4gainst Patentsfor Living Organisms, 7 AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J.
278 (1979).
88. Whale, supra note 1, at 108.
89. Kiley, Learning to Live with the Living Invention, 7 AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J. 220 (1979).
90. The Patent Cooperation Treaty in rule 5.1 (a)(v) contains the requirement that the
best mode be described in an international application. "Best mode" in this context means
depiction that permits the most convenient form of duplication. PATENT RESOURCES
GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 66.
91. See Whale, supra note 1, at 98; see also In re Argoudelis, 434 F. 2d 1390 (1970),
reprinted in 168 U.S. Pat. Q. 99 (1970).
92. The process of genetic engineering involves altering the species genetic makeup to
instill desired characteristics. Such altered genetic elements may be artificially inserted by
scientists into microorganisms with the result that the recipient microorganism takes on new
characteristics which it would not have naturally possessed. These characteristics then be-
come reproduced as part of the normal reproductive process of the microorganism. See
Watson, supra note 61, at 101.
93. It is not clear from the decision in Chakrabarty whether induced mutants will be
considered patentable subject matter. The Court did not address whether a "derivative"
creation gives the original patent owner an action for compensation. See Behringer, supra
note 79, at 134.
94. See Whale, supra note 1, at 108.
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This first argument can be defeated through international
mandates for guidelines and strict regulation.96 Practices of dan-
gerous genetic alterations will be discouraged if severe sanctions
are levied on the violators. Periodic governmental inspections will
uncover illegal practices. Additionally, violators will more likely
be convicted in those countries having liberal evidence rules.97
A second group asserts that patent protection is unnecessary.
They maintain that genetic experimentation flourished long before
any country recognized its patentability.98 Therefore, this faction
contends that substantial incentives exist in this area of experimen-
tation without providing patent protection to microorganisms.99
Giving the scientist legal rights for life forms would only burden
the already overcrowded patent courts."°
This second argument can be attacked constitutionally in
many countries. These nations have supreme laws which require
the continualpromotion of scientific progress. 't Although some in-
centiveI 2 did exist prior to the patenting of microbial products, to-
tal protection through patents has provided even greater
incentives.'" 3 The additional incentives gained through a patent
system would intensify vital cancer, food and energy research. Fur-
thermore, live inventions must receive equal treatment with inani-
mate inventions, regardless of the supplementary burden placed on
the patent courts. Unequal treatment would be a violation of many
95. Id.
96. Numerous nations have initiated regulatory measures, demonstrating worldwide
concern about and desire for biohazard containment. For example, the European Molecular
Biology Organization has established a standing Advisory Committee on Recombinant
DNA, which met on Feb. 14 and 15, 1976, to discuss the National Institute of Health's (NIH)
guidelines and their suitability for implementation in Europe. While European countries
might accept the general principles embodied in the guidelines, certain procedures may not
lend themselves to easy adaption because Europe does not have an organization equivalent
to NIH. It is therefore not clear who could assume the responsibility of certifying biologi-
cally disarmed microorganisms. Comment, Genetic Manipulations. Research Regulation and
Legal Liability Under International Law, 7 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 203, 213 n.5 (1977).
97. See Whale, supra note I, at 108.
98. Id.
99. OFF. TECH. ASSESSMENT REP., supra note 18, at 210.
100. See Mossinghoff, American Bar Association Address, 63 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 342, 343
(1981). There are presently over 200,000 patent applications and 100,000 trademark applica-
tions backlogged in the United States.
101. See G. FLONZ, supra note 26, at 36.
102. Boyer, TheAge of Molecular Biology, 7 AM. PAT. L.A. Q.J. 185 (1979).
103. OFF. TECH. ASSESSMENT REP., supra note 18, at 240.
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nations' constitutions.'04
The third contingent presents a moral argument against pro-
viding patents for man-made microorganisms. 1 5 This group con-
tends that such a procedure of "re-creation" dehumanizes life and
infringes upon their religious values. 10 6 However, the protests of
inhumane experimentation have calmed in recent years. Strict en-
forcement guidelines regarding the permitted types of genetic ex-
periments have aided the control of dangerous experiments. 07
Furthermore, the patent system does not encourage genetic muta-
tions of higher life forms.0 8 Patentable life forms must be capable
of exact duplication. Only microorganisms reproduce with such ac-
curacy. Therefore, until cloning methodology is perfected, higher
life forms will not be patentable, and experimenters will not be able
to obtain the exclusive property right.'0 9 Also, human ownership
through in vitro "0 fetal experiments would not be permitted by
those nations prohibiting involuntary servitude."'I It is doubtful
that the experimenter would undergo the expensive process without
being assured governmental authorization and compensation. 1" 2
Genetic engineering with humans will be subject therefore to strict
governmental guidelines.' 1I
In summary, major countries now believe that scientific ad-
vancement in genetic engineering will be best served if these prod-
ucts are patentable."14  The impact of the opposing arguments
would be intensified if science progresses to the point of precise
higher life form duplication. The patentability of higher life forms
must be addressed when such techniques become available." 5 A
104. See generally G. FLONZ, supra note 26.
105. Sears, The Concept of Societal Consent for Recombinant-DNA Research and Engi-
neering 12 U. TOL. L. REV. 902 (1981).
106. Id. A major concern is that patent protection for life forms may set precedent to the
patenting of test-tube babies. However, ownership through a patent could not occur in the
United States. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII, which prohibits involuntary servitude.
107. Talbot, supra note 70, at 806.
108. Kass, Patenting Life, 63 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 571, 582 (1981).
109. Patents are an intangible property right, meaning the right to own, use or possess.
See generally I D. CHISUM, PATENTS (1983).
110. In vitro means "within glass" and is used to refer to test-tube reproduction. M.
FROBISHER, R. HINSDILL, K. CRABTREE, C. GOODHEART, FUNDAMENTALS OF MICROBI-
OLOGY 124 (1974).
111. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
112. Kiley, supra note 89, at 228.
113. Watson, supra note 61, at 100.
114. Sparrow,-An International Comparative Analysis of the Patentability of Recombinant-
DNA-Derived Organisms 12 U. TOL. L. REV. 926 (1981).
115. Many, but not all countries have excluded animals from patentability. For those
Vol. 14
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more pressing issue entails devising the proper methodology for
patenting microorganisms.
II. THE UNIQUE NATURE OF PATENTING MICROORGANISMS
For the drafter, nothing could be more difficult than to physi-
cally conceptualize a life form on paper. Life is continually in mo-
tion.116 Living matter has properties incapable of visual
perception." 7 Their qualities and attributes are constantly chang-
ing."l 8 Most countries have dealt with this drafting problem by cre-
ating distinct procedures for patenting live products.
A. A Comparative Analysis
Several distinct foreign procedures for the patenting of micro-
organisms currently exist." 9 Patent laws around the world require
an inventor seeking protection to fully describe and disclose every
procedural step and detail surrounding the invention. 120 This dis-
closure is required because the invention must be reproducible in
order to benefit the public.' 2 ' Disclosure of most inanimate inven-
tions can be satisfied by descriptions through words, pictures and
diagrams.122 In order to patent a microbial invention, many coun-
which have not, one seeking patent protection may have a difficult time satisfying the disclo-
sure requirement. The higher the order of the organism, the more unpredictable is its repro-
duction. Thus, even though a living sample of the starting material may be available, there is
often no guarantee the offspring will have the same characteristics as the parents. Until the
technique of cloning in higher animals becomes perfected, this unpredictability will be a
serious obstacle to patentability. See In re Merat, 186 U.S. PAT. Q. 471 (1975).
116. See M. STRICKBERGER, GENETICS 3 (1976).
117. Id.
118. A living organism is constantly exchanging substances with the environment. A tree
absorbs water and salt through its roots and absorbs carbon dioxide through its leaves. A
mammal absorbs water and food substances in the intestine and oxygen in the lungs. A
microorganism also has many properties that go undetected through the microscope. Many
are identified by the chemical reactions they produce. J. SMITH, THE THEORY OF EVOLU-
TION 15 (1975).
119. One of the most interesting systems is the patent system in Yugoslavia. In Yugosla-
via, the inventor is given an option to choose between receiving a patent or a certificate of
invention. Where a certificate is chosen, ownership devolves to the State. Janic, Yugoslavia
Patent Law and Practice, reprinted in DIGEST OF COMMERCIAL LAws OF THE WORLD, PAT-
ENTS AND TRADEMARKS 2 (G. Kohlik ed. 1980). In the People's Republic of China, inven-
tions are categorized and "awarded" in accordance with their value in industrial use. The
inventions are classified into four categories. An invention in the top category receives the
greatest cash reward (10,000 yuan). Hsia & Huan, Laws of the People's Republic of China and
Industrial and Intellectual Property, 5 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 743, 747 (1973).
120. P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS 13, 15 (1982).
121. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976).
122. Schlosser, supra note 52, at 933.
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tries require the deposit of the microorganism with the proper au-
thority. 123 Presently, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the
Soviet Union, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Ireland, the United
States, Yugoslavia and the German Democratic Republic require
the deposit of the microbial invention. 124 In other countries, the
deposit is recommended but not mandatory.
25
The European Patent Convention 126 also established various
laws for the patenting of microorganisms. 27  Rule twenty-eight
states:
If an invention contains a microbial nrocess or the product
thereof and involves a microorganism which is not available to
the public, the European patent application and corresponding
patent shall only be regarded as disclosing the invention in a
manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by
a person skilled in the art if: i) a culture of the microorganism
has been deposited in a culture collection not later than the date
of filing the application; and ii) the application as filed gives such
relevant information as is available to the applicant on the char-
acteristics of the microorganism.'
28
The prevailing international viewpoint resolves the technical
problems of describing "live" inventions in patent applications by
creating procedures that allow deposits of viable samples. Many
beneficial aspects subsist by depositing these samples.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Although a deposit is not mandatory under Spanish law, they do have strict disclo-
sure requirements. Article 62 of the Spanish Patent Law states: "the description ... must
be so detailed and complete as to be able to be put into practice by a person skilled in the
art." See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 126.
The language in Spain is very broad. Compare this with the Soviet Union which makes
deposit of the microorganism mandatory. Section 44 of their Patent Law requires that:
The description of the invention must state the purpose of the invention and must
describe the invention in detail including its distinctive features; it shall also con-
tain data on the technical and economic effectiveness of the utilization of the inven-
tion, the fields of technology to which the invention relates and where the invention
can be utilized, and the claims of the invention.
Id. at 129.
126. See supra note 39. The EPC has eleven member countries. They are: Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Swit-
zerland and the United Kingdom. Other countries not listed here have also been allowed to
accede. See also Winner, supra note 39, at 420.
127. J. SINNOT, supra note 39, at 83-84. See also B. BEETZ, PRACTICING UNDER THE
EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION 13 (1978).
128. J. SINNOT, supra note 39, at 83.
Vol. 14
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B. The Benefits of Depositing the Microbial Invention
Having revealed the difficulty of describing life forms on pa-
per,129 the question now becomes whether the deposit satisfies the
requirements of proper disclosure. Practicality and efficiency
demonstrate the necessity for such a procedure.
First and foremost, the procedure has been determined to be
practical. 3 °  Microorganisms can be readily reproduced, or
reproduce themselves, if propagated from a frozen or lyophilized
sample on or in a nutrient media known to cultivate that organ-
ism. 3' Therefore, a pure culture, once isolated or produced, can be
frozen or lyophilized as a master seed and stored for many years.
This procedure is quite practical, as many domestic patent licenses
run for periods exceeding fifteen years. 132  A subsequent party
could then utilize the invention simply by cultivating the organisms
in the appropriate media under the conditions listed in the original
patent application.
133
Second, the procedure of depositing microorganisms conserves
time.' 34 A more accurate description can be made by depositing
the organism, thereby accelerating the patent procedure. 35 If a
subsequent user of a patented microorangism were only supplied
with a written description, the inventor would be forced to rede-
velop the product. Although some description must accompany the
sample to facilitate cultivation, the written description would be
substantially reduced.
136
129. See Schlosser, supra note 52, at 932.
130. PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 41.
131. Lyophilization is the process of freeze drying. Some products cannot remain viable
if merely frozen and not freeze dried. The type of storage depends upon the particular or-
ganism. Most sample cultures of bacteria and viruses are frozen or lyophilized in the nutri-
ent media in which they are propagated. A common sample might contain 109 organisms
per milliliter. Therefore, when this text refers to "microorganism," it is meant to depict the
entire pure culture of microorganisms. See Kiley, supra note 89, at 228.
132. See G. SPENCER, supra note 30, at 44.
133. The proper patent application is one in which all aspects of the experiment are
listed. This would include a description of the microorganisms' nutrient requirements, such
as coenzymes, starches, sugars and the corresponding quantities of each. A description of the
growth parameters and conditions would also be needed. This description would include the
organisms' temperature, acid, base and oxygen requirements as well as all other conditions
necessary for the organisms' propagation. See H. ZINSSER, MICROBIOLOGY 67 (1976). See
also PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 133 for an example claim of Bacillus
Thuringiensis var.
134. "A bug is worth a thousand words"; see also Teschemacher, supra note 2, at 31.
135. See Lederer, supra note 10, at 289.
136. Schlosser, supra note 52, at 934.
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Moreover, the procedure of depositing the sample is less ex-
pensive than the written description typically used for inanimate
inventions. Fewer hours would be required by the drafting attor-
neys since they would not be required to fully describe the inven-
tion on paper. Additionally, the subsequent users could spend less
money developing the patented invention since the product would
be available in its completed form.'3 7
C The Needfor a Uniform Depositary System
Due to expensive translation and prosecution costs, the cost of
patenting internationally continues to inflate at a shocking pace.
38
An inventor who seeks to patent his invention in a particular nation
is subject to the domestic laws of that State. 139 Furthermore, the
patent laws of many of these nations require the individual deposit
of a microorganism for that country's patent purpose. 40 In many
cases, deposits made in foreign countries might not be accepted. 141
In many countries, patent applicants who seek to market their
inventions must make individual deposits in each country where
the inventor wishes the invention protected. 142 Numerous deposits
increase the probability of error or omission detrimental to the ac-
quisition of the patent. 143 The inventor, by making deposits in for-
eign nations, is confronted with unfamiliar languages and
currencies. Further, the inventor must contend with unknown de-
positary officials over confusing technical, legal and administrative
depositary requirements.144 Many problems could be alleviated by
the establishment of a uniform system throughout the different
countries. The first attempt to create such uniformity in this area
was the establishment of the Budapest Treaty. 145
137. Id.
138. Winner, supra note 39, at 431. A cost estimate for filing foreign applications was
$1000 per case as of May 1978. Present figures for non-English-speaking countries average
over $2000, and in Sweden and Japan may be as high as $4000. (Estimates based on state-
ments for fees received from foreign associates directed to the firm of Sheridan, Ross, Fields
and McIntosh, Denver, Colo., Sept. 1979 through June 1980).
139. G. POLLIZIEN, INTERNATIONAL LICENSING AGREEMENTS 8 (1974).
140. See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 136-37.
141. Schlosser, supra note 52, at 935. This would be true in those nations which do not
recognize microorganisms as patentableper se. For a complete compilation of the countries
that recognize microorganisms as patentable per se, see PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC.,
supra note 9, at 136-37.
142. Schlosser, supra note 52, at 935.
143. Id.
144. See Whale, supra note 1, at 107.
145. See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 12.
Vol. 14
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III. THE BUDAPEST TREATY: AN INTERNATIONAL ATTEMPT TO
CREATE UNIFORMITY IN THE PATENTING OF
MICROORGANISMS
A. Background
The Budapest Treaty 46 was designed to eliminate many of the
international problems inherent in the deposit of man-made micro-
organisms. On April 28, 1977, eighteen nations signed this agree-
ment, 147 which established the International Depositary Authority
(IDA). 148 The purpose of the Treaty was to secure a system of de-
positaries within the member countries which would reduce the ex-
pense and confusion of the international patenting of man-made
microorganisms. 49  First, the agreement provides one set of rules
and requirements for the patenting of microorganisms, which is ad-
ministered by one organization-the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO). 5 ° This provision facilitates an understand-
ing of applicable patent rules. The patentee need learn only one set
of rules, rather than having to learn the regulations of every coun-
try in which protection is sought. Second, the Treaty creates some
uniformity.'' The patentee is able to obtain exclusive patenting
rights in a variety of foreign nations with minimal expense and
confusion. 
52
The Treaty provides that an inventor can receive patent pro-
tection in all member States with only one deposit. 53 Further, the
Treaty mandates that contracting States which allow or require the
146. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9.
147. See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 12.
148. Id.
149. Under United States patent law, if an inventor publishes his work or places his
invention on sale, he has one year after making the invention public to file his patent applica-
tion. During this year he can test the commercial value of his invention and decide whether
it is worth the expense of patenting. Some countries do not allow this grace period. They
hold that if an invention has been published or used anywhere in the world before filing the
application, patenting is absolutely barred. This example illustrates another reason for es-
tablishing a uniform system for patenting inventions. See Winner, supra note 39, at 422.
150. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is an intergovernmental or-
ganization with headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. WIPO promotes the protection of
intellectual property throughout the world through the cooperation of various States. It is
also responsible for the administration of several unions founded on multilateral treaties. A
substantial portion of its activities and resources is devoted to assisting developing countries.
See WIPO, General Information, WIPO Publication No. 400E (1981).
151. See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 12.
152. Schlosser, supra note 52, at 935.
153. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, art. I (Establishment ofa Union) (1977).
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deposit of the microorganisms, 154 recognize a deposit in any inter-
national depositary authority.' Such recognition shall include the
fact' 56 and date of the deposit.' By virtue of these rules, an inven-
tor is assured that the exclusive right of the invention will be
granted in all member States from the time of filing.15 8 This guar-
antee will continue for the duration of the IDA recognition.'59
The Treaty is open to all nations which are members of the
Paris Union Convention. 6 ° All States can become members of the
Convention.' Therefore, the Budapest Treaty likewise remains
open to all countries who agree to abide by its provisions. 162 The
,,jr, ro visins of Lite Treaty demonstrate the effectiveness ot'a
uniform patent system. Problems arise when the Treaty fails to ex-
tend its authority over international infringements. 1
63
B. Requirements to Acquire IDA Status
In order to acquire IDA status, a depositary must fulfill spe-
cific requirements provided by the Treaty. 164 First, an institution
must have continual existence within a member State. 165  The
Treaty requires samples in each of the depositaries to be closely
regulated to protect the patentee's rights.166 If a depositary were to
transfer samples to a non-member State, compliance with this regu-
lation would be virtually impossible. Second, if a depositary within
a member country ceased to maintain the proper facilities for these
154. The IDA is governed by an International Bureau. The chief executive of the Bu-
reau shall be the chief executive of the Union and shall represent the Union. Budapest
Treaty, supra note 9, art. II, §§ 1-4.
155. PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 12.
156. Id. at 19.
157. Id.
158. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
159. See infra text accompanying notes 178-185 for a discussion of the length of storage
of a deposited invention.
160. The Budapest Treaty is open to membership to any country belonging to the Paris
Union Convention. Furthermore, Article 9 of the Treaty contains a special provision under
which only intergovernmental organizations having authority to grant regional patents to
several countries may accept certain obligations under the Treaty. See PATENT RESOURCES
GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 14; see also Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, art. 9 (Intergovern-
mental Industrial Property Organization).
161. Administrative matters will be conducted by the contracting States of the Treaty.
One delegate will represent each country. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9.
162. Id.
163. See generally PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9.
164. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, rule 3 (4cquisition ofthe Status ofthe IDA).
165. Id. art. 6, § 2.3.
166. Id. rule 2, § 2.2.
Vol. 14
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samples, IDA status would be terminated. '67 Third, all institutions
must be impartial and objective.' 68 Inventors who may wish to de-
posit in various nations would be discouraged from patenting
abroad if a member State were to extend preferential treatment to
its citizens.' 69 Finally, an institution must accept specified strains
of microorganisms for deposit, 70 examine their viability, and store
them properly. '
7'
Problems develop once the depositary of a particular nation
acquires IDA status. The Treaty permits each State to legislate its
own laws for acceptance and release of the samples. Germany has
expressed legitimate doubt as to the effectiveness of international
detection devices for uncovering infringements.
7 2
C. Transfer of Deposits
The Treaty regulations provide an essential safeguard for de-
positors. 173 If an international depositary authority should tempo-
rarily or definitely discontinue performance, the State in which the
depositary is located must transfer all microorganisms without con-
tamination and all accompanying records to another international
depositary. "I Additionally, the IDA must notify all depositors and
the Director General 75 of all action taken.'76 This procedure, vital
to the inventor's patent rights, assures the continued maintenance
of deposits in an IDA. 7 7 An inventor must be guaranteed that the
patent rights will be maintained for the statutory period. Inventors
who are promised continual protection will be encouraged to re-
lease their products abroad.
D. Length of Storage and Confidentiality
Another Treaty provision requires that microorganisms be
167. Id. art. 8 (Termination and Limitation of the Status of the IDA).
168. Id. art. 6, § 2.3.
169. Id. § 2.5.
170. Id.
171. See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 20-21.
172. Id.; see also Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5 (Import and Export Restrictions).
173. If a member country refuses to accept a sample, the country must notify the Director
General. The Director General will in turn notify the contracting States involved. Budapest
Treaty, supra note 9, rule 5.2.
174. Id. rule 5 (Storage or Microorganisms).
175. Id. § (a)(4).
176. Id.
177. See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 16.
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stored for at least thirty years. 178 Furthermore, the Treaty requires
the IDA to guarantee the secrecy of the inventor's information dur-
ing this period.' 79 The institution shall not reveal whether the mi-
croorganism has been deposited. 18  The depositary may only
divulge this information to either an authorized individual' 8 ' or
one who is legally entitled to this knowledge.' 82
The Treaty, within this section, advocates secrecy, yet man-
dates no provision for restitution if the confidentiality requirement
is violated. The contents of the invention should only be divulged
to persons who have either legal rights or permission from the in-
ventor to gailluaccess to a 1 0. -- T he Treaiy has ailowed
each nation to retain jurisdiction over infringement suits within its
boundaries.'84 However, these laws contain substantial disparity as
to the proper legal remedies involved. 185 For example, an inventor
in England might find the relief granted for a secrecy violation in
other countries to be inadequate. If the English inventor were to
find other nations' laws improper, he could be discouraged from
releasing the information beyond English boundaries. A compila-
tion of such examples would have a profound effect on an interna-
tional patent system.
E. Redepositing the Microorganism, Maintaining the Patent
The Budapest Treaty also allows the depositor to make a re-
placement deposit if the original is lost or destroyed. 186 A replace-
ment, for purposes of deposit, is considered to have been made on
the date of the original filing. 187 The patentee must sign a state-
ment that the new deposit is identical to the microorganism initially
deposited.'t8  This safeguard assures the patentee the exclusive
right to the invention for the statutory period. Additionally, this
178. See Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, rule 9 (Storage of Microorganisms).
179. The rules for granting release of sample will be discussed at length later in this
Comment. See infra text accompanying note 287.
180. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, rule 9.2.
181. Id. rule 11 (Furnishing Samples).
182. See Schlosser, supra note 52, at 935.
183. The Treaty also requires the depositary to check the viability of the organism (a)
promptly after any deposit or transfer; (b) at reasonable intervals, depending upon the spe-
cies deposited; and (c) at any time requested by the depositor. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9,
rule 10.1.
184. See PATENT RESOURCEs GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 21.
185. Kiley, supra note 89, at 229.
186. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, rule 6.2 (Making a New Deposit).
187. Id.
188. Id. rule 6.2(a).
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procedure guarantees that the patent information will be available
to others during this period.'89 Any controversies concerning the
precision of duplication of the original deposit will be resolved by
national or regional law. 190
Disparity between each nation's determination of whether pre-
cise duplication occurred could also burden international courts
with numerous suits. Theoretically, the inventor could modify the
organism before resubmission. This replacement might be consid-
ered an "exact duplication"'91 in one country and a "derivative"' 92
in another. The problem is exaggerated when the patentee receives
additional property rights with a derivative.
193
F Depositor's Requirements Under the International Depositary
Authority
In order for the deposit to receive patent protection, the depos-
itor must fulfill certain requirements under the Treaty. For exam-
ple, depositors must sign a written affidavit which includes various
declarations. First, inventors must indicate that the deposit com-
plies with the provisions of the Budapest Treaty and the depositor
will not withdraw the information for a minimum of thirty years. 194
Second, inventors must release their name and address to enable
contact by prospective users and the Director General.' 95 Third,
inventors must detail the proper propagation, storage and testing
conditions for the microorganisms. 196 Fourth, the inventor must
indicate the microorganisms' dangerous propensities, or admit to
not knowing whether such potential danger exists. The Treaty rec-
ommends, but does not require, that the statement contain a scien-
189. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
190. See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 31; see also Budapest Treaty,
supra note 9, art. 4(2).
191. "Exact duplication" means isolated from the original culture and patented without
any further genetic engineering performed. See Whale, The ABCD's of Patent Infringement,
62 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 136, 137 (1980). A direct infringement requires doing the same thing
in the same way to get the same result. This could be called "umbral" infringement. It
forces the defendant to do a microinspection of the patent records. But direct infringement is
also doing substantially the same thing in substantially the same way to substantially get the
same result. Id.
192. "Derivative" means isolated from the original culture but altered in some way
through genetic engineering. See Behringer, supra note 79, at 134.
193. The inventor may make a derivative that has more usefulness in the commercial
market than the microorganism originally deposited. Id.
194. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, rule 6(a) (Making the Original Deposit).
195. See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 32-34.
196. Id. at 32.
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tific description of the organism.1 97
The IDA may refuse to accept the deposit regardless of
whether the above requirements are met. For example, the micro-
organisms might not be of a species for which the IDA gives assur-
ances of patentability. Furthermore, the IDA might also not be
suited to handle the properties of a particular organism, or the de-
posit may be defective for scientific reasons. 9 ' Therefore, the
Treaty does not specify criteria for member countries to determine
whether a certain microorganism is patentable subject matter.' 99
This question is resolved by the patent laws of each country.2"
However, individual depositaries can specify the categories of mi-
croorganisms which would be acceptable. The depositary can trans-
mit this list to the Director General.20 Therefore, an inventor can
discover whether a country would accept his deposit without hav-
ing to translate foreign laws.
In all cases, once a Treaty depositary accepts an organism, the
date of patent protection relates back to the original date of de-
posit.2" 2 This benefit can be significant when competing inventors
race to obtain exclusive rights to a unique and potentially valuable
invention.
2 0 3
G. Accessibility to the Deposited Samples
Opponents of the Treaty predominantly criticize the regula-
tions which direct the furnishing of a deposited sample to subse-
quent third-party users.2" Under the rules of the Treaty, third-
party users can gain access to deposits in three situations. First, the
depositor may directly authorize access to the user. 0 5 Second, a
national granting authority20 6 may itself gain access to a deposit.
Finally, if the subsequent third-party user does not qualify under
these situations but is legally entitled to obtain the sample, he might
197. Id.
198. Id. at 33.
199. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
200. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, rule 6.1(B).
201. Id. rule 3.1 (Communication).
202. Id. art. 4 (l)(d). The new deposit shall be treated as if it had been made on the date
which the original deposit was made, if viable, and where it is made within three months
after the depositor received notification of the organisms lack of viability.
203. See Watson, supra note 61, at 101.
204. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, rule 1 (Furnishing of Samples).
205. Id. § 11.2.
206. See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 23.
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also gain access.2 °7 Apparently, authority under the first two sec-
tions does not pose problems if the sample is used only for patent
experimentations authorized by the States.2 °8 Several problems
have arisen, however, regarding the third mode of access.
The Treaty does not propose specific laws for access by a third-
party user. These regulations are legislated by the country in which
the depositary is located.20 9 Therefore, although an inventor can
acquire protection in all member countries with only one deposit,
each country may select those individuals who are entitled to the
depositor's samples. Under the third course of access, a party must
adhere to the laws of the country in which the sample is acquired,
even if the inventor intends to use the sample in another nation.
210
In order to acquire access to a sample in another country, the user
must request a sample through an official form which bears an au-
thorized certification.2 1' Certification occurs only when the laws of
the country in which the depositary is located are fulfilled. There-
fore, a State can potentially restrict access to all samples within its
depositaries.
A country which restricts access, however, must submit a state-
ment justifying this decision to the Director General and the Inter-
national Bureau.21 2 Furthermore, a person who is unjustifiably
denied access to a sample can submit a formal request to the Direc-
tor General to terminate the institution's status as a member of the
IDA.213 Upon such a request, the Bureau has the duty to investi-
gate the situation and determine whether the complaint is well
founded.214
These regulations are an effective safeguard against prejudicial
restrictions imposed upon foreign users. However, the laws do not
have sufficient clarity in all situations. For example, contracting
States might justify restrictive actions as being necessary to the
health and safety of the nation.2 15 Problems arise when certain
countries abuse their sovereign privilege. Claims of health and
207. The user may be given permission by a licensee of the original creator. Budapest
Treaty, supra note 9, § 11.3.
208. Id. § 11.1.
209. PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 25.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 26.
212. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, rule 3.1.
213. Id. art. VIII (Termination and Limitation of the Status of the IDA).
214. Id. rule 3.1(c).
215. Lederer, supra note 10, at 293.
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safety violations could entail hints of sovereign prejudice.216 Such
claims would have a deterrent effect on foreign patent applicants.
Foreign inventors must be accorded equal treatment in all member
countries, otherwise the purpose of the Treaty-to establish a uni-
form patent system-would be defeated.
The Budapest Treaty also authorizes contracting States to
deny access to the depositaries. A contracting nation can impose
import and export restrictions on samples located within its deposi-
taries.217 The Treaty, however, does not provide regulations which
can countermand the export and import restrictions of a member
country. The Treaty merely encourages each member to restrict
access to its depositaries if the limitation is necessary to prevent
contamination of the environment and to preserve national
security.218
The problems of international accessibility present many vital
issues. One major question is whether the IDA should have the
authority to overrule export and import restrictions. This problem
is immediate, since Germany has already passed laws which com-
pletely restrict exportation of German samples.2'9 The United
States is presently contemplating the enactment of similar laws.
These laws could have significant ramifications if adopted on a
world-wide basis. The principle objective of the Treaty is to en-
courage transfer of valuable technology. A multitude of restrictive
laws would shatter any homogeneity and thwart the Treaty's
objectives.
The Budapest Treaty, therefore, falls far short of its goals. The
Treaty advocates secrecy, but mandates no provision for uniform
enforcement. The Treaty grants inventors a right for resubmission
in the case of sample destruction, yet fails to control resubmission
abuses. Finally, the Treaty permits multiple patent grants upon
one deposit, but does not warrant sample release to each State. The
foregoing problems are clearly evidenced by examining underde-
veloped and developed nations' exercise of sovereign rights.
IV. THE FAILURES OF THE BUDAPEST TREATY: EXERCISING
SOVEREIGN RIGHTS
A developed invention, to be considered patentable, must meet
216. See Landau, supra note 15, at 140.
217. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5 (Export and Import Restrictions).
218. PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 29.
219. Id. at 81.
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the requirement of utility, novelty, nonobviousness and enable-
ment. 220 An invention with societal value must enable others to
gain access to the information.22' Additionally, inventions geomet-
rically accelerate the development of other ideas and new products
into the market.222 The resulting effect propels society forward
with creative products which facilitate an easier lifestyle. Interna-
tional patents allow the world to gain more information than any
individual nation could acquire.
Individual countries, as well as the international community,
suffer from the prohibition of access to new information.223 How-
ever, certain situations require the preservation of independence,
national security, health and environmental conditions, and de-
mand certain restrictions regarding access to the information.
The Budapest Treaty leaves vital areas of control open to pre-
emption by member nations. Uniformity is advocated but not ful-
filled. These shortcomings are evidenced by the past restrictive
measures of Third World nations and by those of Germany.
.4. Third World Restrictions Under the Paris Union Convention
Industrialized nations have argued against the admission of
Third World States in an international patent system. 224 A tremen-
dous disparity of wealth and knowledge exists between developed
and underdeveloped countries. 221 Discontent over former colonial-
ism has inspired Third World nations to achieve identity through
independent sovereignty. These nations have impeded worldwide
transfer by restricting the importation of technology and foreign
investment.226 These States have equated industrialization with co-
lonial dictatorships. Furthermore, they have also prohibited an i-
flux of genetic technology. Genetic experimentation contravenes
many Third World nations' ideals of morality.227
Industrialized nations have criticized the membership of Third
World countries in the Paris Union Convention, contending that
220. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
221. Id.
222. In the United States not all improved inventions are patentable. For example, the
new use doctrine bars the discoverer of a new use for a known compound from obtaining a
patent with composition claims regardless of the level of inventiveness exercised. I A. DEL-
LER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS 244-72 (1964).
223. Landau, supra note 15, at 105.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 151.
227. Id. at 115.
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the Third World's restrictive laws defeat uniformity. Furthermore,
technology released*from Third World nations is minimal as com-
pared with technological achievement in developed nations.228
These arguments were addressed at the revised Paris Union
Convention of 1967.229 The Convention concluded that the advan-
tages of Third World membership outweigh the disadvantages.23 °
Third World membership in an international patent system main-
tains partial uniformfty .23 1 Although these countries retain special
sovereign rights, the importation of some technology is allowed.232
The accepted inventions allow advancement, at least, to a minimal
degree. ithe industrialized countries were to expel Third World
nations from the uniform patent system, importation would occur
at a far slower pace. Disparity of wealth and ideas would continue
to expand.233 Developed countries would also suffer since the
Third World nations would be dissuaded from internationally re-
leasing the few discoveries they do uncover.
Additionally, Third World nations provide adequate reciproc-
ity. Some countries have achieved specialization in areas which re-
main untouched in developed nations. Multinational corporations
now develop natural resources in Third World nations. 234 There-
fore, unless these countries are admitted to a uniform system, the
incentive to market their resources will be insubstantial. The in-
centive to have these countries market abroad is essential to de-
crease the huge disparities between Third World nations and the
industrialized countries.
The examples set by the Paris Union Convention should be
regarded as legal international precedent to the Budapest Treaty.
The arguments presented demonstrate the reasons for unrestricted
membership to the Paris Union Convention. Members of the Paris
228. Whatever the ultimate causes may be, the underdeveloped nations depend for their
growth on the techniques of the advanced countries . . . the third world nations can not
achieve more than a few firms in each industry. Hence the third world nations must rely
more and more upon the techniques and products imported from developed countries. Id. at
112.
229. See Gansser, supra note 16, at 148.
230. Id.
231. If these countries are admitted, at least some technology will travel between devel-
oped and underdeveloped nations. These nations do not prohibit all importation. See Lan-
dau, supra note 15, at 134.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Patents granted by Third World nations are mostly received by foreign corpora-
tions. 1d. at 106.
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Union Convention are invitees of the Budapest Treaty. 235 The
Convention passed special laws 236 which have encouraged Third
World nations to join the uniform patent system.237 The Budapest
Treaty should, likewise, encourage nations to adopt the uniform
system of patenting life forms. Germany's restrictive laws, how-
ever, pose a threat to the uniform system.
B. Germany's Exercise of Restrictions Under the Budapest Treaty
Germany is one member of the Budapest Treaty which has
passed confined laws.238 The development of these restrictive regu-
lations was triggered by the shortcomings of other German patent
laws. In Germany, as in many other European countries under the
European Patent Convention, the file of a patent application is
open to the public at any stage of the examination procedure.239
The German laws differ from United States patent rules in that the
release of information is allowed only after a patent has been
granted.24 ° In the United States, information is protected once le-
gally available to the public.
Germany's laws were founded on the principle that informa-
tion should be disclosed at the earliest possible date: the point of
publication of an unexamined application. A deposited microorga-
nism is considered part of disclosure and, consequently, should be
released at the point of application. 24' Therefore, under current
German law, a sample will be released to third-party users without
patent protection. Applicants may, however, require recipients to
identify themselves and agree not to transmit samples to subse-
quent users.242 Third-party users must also agree to use the sample
in a manner conforming to German patent law.243 Apparently,
Germany feels secure that German citizens will abide by these
235. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, art. 9 (Intergovernmental Industrial Property
Organizations).
236. The laws included changes in: 1) national treatment; 2) right of priority; 3) indepen-
dence of patents; 4) compulsory licensing and forfeiture; and 5) importation of articles and
products manufactured by a process patented in the importing country. See Landau, supra
note 15, at 139.
237. Id.
238. The others include the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Sweden and
Italy. See PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 136.
239. See Lederer, supra note 10, at 292.
240. See Feldman v. Aunslup, 517 F.2d 1351 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
241. Lederer, supra note 10, at 292.
242. Id. The decision in BGH "Btckerhefe" GRUR 430 (1975) which confirmed this
rule is still current law.
243. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, rule I 1.3(a)(iii).
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laws. The recent German export and import restrictions, however,
suggest that the government was not willing to trust the citizens of
other nations. Germany's position is founded on several
arguments.
1. Compensationfor Infringements Abroad. If a product is a
viable microorganism, transfer of the invention is quite simple. Mi-
croorganisms multiply exponentially when proper environmental
conditions are maintained. 2" Thus, an unauthorized user who ac-
quires a microorganism from the IDA could transmit the product
with little oppor.urhity for objection by the originl pntentee 245
Unauthorized transmission is more probable when the subsequent
user is in another country.
In many situations, the original patentee and the depositary
have virtually no opportunity to effectively police the unauthorized
use of inventions. Following the original deposit, once an infring-
ing product appears in another member country's market, an action
for compensation becomes available as a legal remedy.246 In many
situations, however, the original microorganism could be geneti-
cally altered, which may deny the original patentee
compensation.247
The current international law classifying the types of "de-
rived" organisms which are protected is unclear. 248 Through the
discovery of recombinant DNA 249 and the subsequent advances in
technology, genetic alterations are not terribly difficult. 210  The
DNA sequences of one organism can be artificially introduced into
the DNA sequences of another microorganism, eventually produc-
244. See H. ZINSSER, supra note 133, at 68.
245. G. TAYLOR, THE BIOLOGICAL TIME BOMB 9 (1968).
246. One of the reasons for allowing sample submission for the deposit of microorga-
nisms is that they can be reproduced in virtually equivalent form as the original. The argu-
ments against allowing samples for higher life forms arise because these organisms do not
duplicate with such exactness. See Zimmerman, The Case Against Patents for Living Orga-
nisms, 7 AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J. 278 (1979).
247. See Behringer, supra note 79, at 134.
248. Id. at 133-34.
249. Recombinant DNA is the DNA of one organism inserted into the gene sequence of
another. In bacteria, the DNA is isolated from small circular loops in their cytoplasm called
plasmids. These plasmids can be isolated from the bacterial cell and cut open by a restriction
endonuclease enzyme. From another organism (plant, frog, fly or man) the DNA of the cells
can also be isolated through the use of these enzymes. When the pieces of DNA are mixed in
vitro and recombined, a new bacteria can be created with an entirely different genetic se-
quence. For a visual description, see Talbot, supra note 70, at 804, 805.
250. See Behringer, supra note 79, at 137.
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ing an organism which is quite different.25 1 A similar experiment
with recombinant-DNA was used by Chakrabarty to yield oil eat-
ing bacteria. 2 Furthermore, alterations of the microorganism can
now be synthesized without destroying the basic utility of the in-
vention. Although the microorganisms could be genetically differ-
ent, the new microorganisms might be as useful an invention as the
original patented product. Therefore, unless the patent law applies
to organisms "derived from" '25 3 the original deposit, the patentee's
original idea could be infringed upon without providing a cause of
action.
Presently, only the European Patent Convention, whose mem-
bers are invitees of the Budapest Treaty,25 4 has passed a provision
which restricts uncompensated "derived organisms." '255 The Euro-
pean Patent Convention defines a "derived culture" as one which
still exhibits those characteristics of the deposited culture which are
essential to effectuate the invention.256 Therefore, Germany justi-
fies the laws restricting access to their depositaries on the grounds
that their government cannot effectively control the unauthorized
appropriation of an inventor's microorganism outside Germany.
Although Germany can police patent infringement more effectively
within its boundaries, a total ban on importation and exportation is
much too stringent.
2. Potential Safety Hazards. Germany also maintains that
the purposes of these measures were to promote national security,
health and environmental safety. Microorganisms can be altered to
benefit society but can also be altered to create potentially danger-
ous forms. Segments of DNA from a pathogenic organism, trans-
muted into the DNA of a patented bacteria, can procreate an
organism that produces a disease for which there is no known
cure.257 Most countries prohibit this type of dangerous experimen-
tation,258 but the hazard would be even more prevalent if such or-
251. The Monsanto Corporation has recently found a way to transfer a genetic trait from
a bacterium to a plant cell. San Diego Union, Jan. 19, 1983, at A19, col. 4.
252. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, supra note 49, at 310.
253. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9.
254. Id. art. 9.
255. PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 35. The European Patent Con-
vention derived much of its substantial law from the 1963 Strasbourg Convention. This Con-
vention is also open to any member of the Paris Union. Id.
256. Teschemacher, supra note 2, at 40.
257. See Sears, supra note 105, at 902.
258. Talbot, supra note 70, at 806.
31
Schroeder: Patenting Microorganisms: Working the Bugs Out of the Internation
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
ganisms were to find their way into the hands of terrorist groups. If
the patentee or the depositary is unable to police the transfer of the
patented organism within another country, the problem becomes,
in fact, a real one. Therefore, until sufficient safeguards exist in all
member countries, import and export restrictions may be the most
practical methods of control.
3. Other Problems with the Depositary System. Another risk
embodied in the present depositary system is the possibility that a
deposited culture may arrive at a depositary in a nonviable condi-
tio~ in, wvhich _ dep t date ,-,, bep Aptn di.. 259 Tf aA,+,
not secured, the resulting invention will not be protected.26 ° Under
the Budapest Treaty, the legal consequences of an initial negative
viability test are left to the discretion of each nation.261 The Treaty
only safeguards the loss of viability of a deposit after the original
sample has been accepted.262 The Treaty provides that if the origi-
nal deposit is lost or destroyed, a depositor may supply an identical
substitute culture without loss of the original date of deposit.263
The procedure does not extend protection to a deposit which before
acceptance, and through no fault of a depositor, is not deemed
viable.
Additionally, various countries might prohibit certain claims
on the ground that the deposited organism is not considered patent-
able subject matter. Therefore, even if an inventor seeks to market
his invention in all member nations, the microorganism must be of
the type which will be accepted. The protection would be limited
solely to those countries which regard the microorganism as patent-
able. Moreover, an inventor will expect the invention to be pro-
tected by virtue of acceptance in other member States. A uniform
rule is therefore necessary. 26
Another problem concerns the lack of uniformity regarding
the periods of time for which culture deposits must be main-
tained.265 Many countries require maintenance of the cultures
throughout the life of the patent;266 others require maintenance be-
259. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, art. 4(l)(a).
260. Id.
261. PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 31.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Hayashi, supra note 3, at 306.
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yond the life of the patent. 267 The requirement for maintenance
subsequent to the patent life reflects the policy that a culture should
remain available after the life of the patent. If the product becomes
unavailable, the original patentee could retain his exclusive rights
well beyond the life of the patent, as the sole person able to use and
experiment with the microorganism.
This problem, however, seems unlikely. During the lifetime of
the patent, an individual who acquires the sample can establish his
own permanent sample through recultivation and storage.2 6 8
Therefore, a post-protection requirement would merely increase the
cost and complexity of the patenting process.
2 6 9
Some problems in the Treaty could be easily remedied. Other
areas, however, deserve more consideration by the member
countries.
V. PROPOSALS FOR AN AMENDED TREATY
Germany's restrictions have caused significant international
concern. The United States is contemplating the enactment of sim-
ilar laws. 27° Although the laws imposed on inventors by Germany
would maintain closer scrutiny of potential infringements, the ef-
fects deter international dissemination of information. The follow-
ing suggestions could be more practical for all countries concerned.
A. Penalty Clauses Should be Specified in Greater Detail
The Budapest Treaty does not mandate a uniform set of rules
for secrecy violations. The Treaty must dictate more specific pen-
alty clauses for the misuse of the deposited organisms. Addition-
ally, all users should be required to report the status and location of
the original deposit to the IDA.271 Furthermore, if any misuses are
discovered, the Treaty should mandate strict penalties to the origi-
nal user. This may be a harsh rule, especially if the original user is
not the individual violating the safety regulations. However, the
rule would deter the original users from passing on a sample with-
out authorization.272 Finally, if the laws were uniformly strict, in-
267. Id.
268. Kiley, supra note 89, at 228.
269. Teschemacher, supra note 2, at 29.
270. Telephone interview with Mr. Koch, Patent attorney from Alexandria, Virginia,
specializing in international patent law, Oct., 1982.
271. See supra notes 204-14 and accompanying text.
272. Id.
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ventors would trust foreign depositaries, thus encouraging
international marketing of inventions.
B. A Un!form Set of Rules for Patentability Must be Mandated
by the Treaty
In order to create uniformity of patent procedures among the
member nations, the Treaty must promulgate rules establishing the
products which will be recognized as patentable subject matter.
273
The rules should provide a list of microorganisms known to be
ableper se .275 Further, the Treaty must be amended to incorporate
all elements necessary for patentability. 276 The present Treaty is
noticeably vague on this point.277 This amendment would provide
inventors in all member countries with a clear understanding of
those inventions which will be recognized as patentable. The clar-
ity would help inventors change research into areas which would
yield patentable and eventually profitable inventions. Once made
aware of unpatentable microorganisms, it is unlikely that inventors
would spend time and money in their research. One objective of
the Treaty was to eliminate much of the cost and confusion of pat-
enting abroad. An international definition of patentable subject
matter would fulfill this objective.
C The Treaty Should Extend the Exclusive Rights of the
Patented Microorganisms to All "Derived Cultures"
The Treaty must define the term "derived culture. ' 278 This
definition should be more detailed than the one described in the
European Patent Convention.279 This definition would provide the
273. Id. at notes 31-37.
274. "Potentially" in this situation should be defined as having the strong possibility of
developing into actuality. See WEBSTER'S SEVENTH COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 665 (1969).
275. Not only should the product be excluded from patentability, but also the processes,
techniques and components of these organisms should be likewise excluded from patentabil-
ity. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1028 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
276. The Treaty should establish a complete compilation of the requirements necessary
for patentability. A uniform rule should be established so that foreign inventors will have a
better understanding of rules abroad.
277. Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2 (Definitons).
278. The definition could read: A "derivative" organism is an organism received from a
specific source or origin having properties and qualities which lack a sufficient degree of
inventiveness from previously patented organisms. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra
note 275, at 399.
279. Lederer, supra note 10, at 296.
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IDA, depositors, and all subsequent users with insight as to which
products infringe upon the original deposit. Additionally, the
Treaty must guarantee that all users of "derived cultures" be penal-
ized for not compensating the original patentee. Such sanctions
would deter unauthorized transfer of samples by third-party users.
Therefore, the Treaty would grant the foreign inventor an interna-
tional property right.280 Furthermore, a uniform remedy would
create an understandable register of the remedies available. If in-
ventors are assured a protectable property right, they would be en-
couraged to release a new discovery into the international
community.
D. Viability Must be Uniformly Established to Take Effect on the
Date of the Original Deposit
A patentee should not be penalized if, absent any fault of his
own, the IDA does not find his product viable and, therefore, does
not grant acceptance. 28 1 The Treaty allows for a replacement sam-
ple without losing the original deposit date. However, when the
microorganism loses its viability after deposit, but before accept-
ance,282 the IDA does not allow the inventor to retain the original
deposit date.283 It would be more practical if a replacement sample
is allowed, under certain circumstances, even if initial viability is
not found. A determination of initial nonviability should give a
good faith inventor the right to make two additional deposits. This
opportunity would safeguard any negligence on the part of the de-
positary. However, if the third sample were found "inherently"
284
nonviable, the patentee would be bound to redraft his instructions
and reexperiment with the organism.
E. Protection Should be Given from the Point of Application
Germany could minimize the risk of uncompensated transfer
of samples by providing immediate patent protection once the de-
posit is made. Germany's law currently requires depositaries to re-
280. See Gansser, supra note 16, at 168.
281. PATENT RESOURCES GROUP, INC., supra note 9, at 33.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. "Inherent" in this situation should be defined: "The condition of the essential char-
acter is such that it will be habitually repeated under identical conditions." WEBSTER'S NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 593 (1976). This suggestion may, however, run counter to the
requirement that the inventor must reduce the embodiment to practice before protection can
be obtained. See supra note 64.
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lease samples, even if the sample is not protected by a patent.285
Germany believes that the risk of infringement is greater outside its
jurisdiction.286 Although the effectiveness of German law within its
boundaries is unclear, domestic infringement will probably occur
once genetic technology advances to the level which has been ob-
tained in the United States. Germany could eliminate the risk by
echoing the patent laws of the United States and providing immedi-
ate protection from the time of application.
F Impose Harsh Safety Regulations
If the Treaty imposes stricter safety regulations, member coun-
tries would be encouraged to allow accessibility to their deposita-
ries. It is unlikely that member nations, such as Germany, would
agree to the International Bureau287 or WIPO exclusively regulat-
ing the accessibility of the samples at the IDA within their country.
However, WIPO or the Bureau must a least encourage all member
States to allow for accessibility unless a sample poses real dangers.
All of the proposed suggestions would discourage nations such
as Germany and the United States from imposing import and ex-
port restrictions. The international flow of novel information,
which was one of the original objectives of the Budapest Treaty,
must be maintained. If Germany prohibits access, other nations
will soon follow. Therefore, member countries must take immedi-
ate action to prevent a cascade of new restrictions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Genetic engineering could become the genesis of cancer eradi-
cation.288 This former unattainable vision has become a legitimate
theory indebted to incentives created by the patent system.289 Ad-
ditionally, other valuable microbial inventions are attributed to
patent inducement.29 ° Internationalpatent systems would undoubt-
edly accelerate inventiveness in genetic engineering at even a
greater pace than provided by domestic patent systems. Concern
285. See Lederer, supra note 10, at 296.
286. Id.
287. See Budapest Treaty, supra note 9, art. Ii, for the requirements the Treaty edicts for
the International Bureau.
288. See M. STRICKBERGER, supra note 116, at 570.
289. See Behringer, supra note 79, at 137.
290. "The important and laudable achievement in insulin copying supports the positive
expectations of scientists to the potential benefit of millions of persons now living and yet to
be born." Kiley, supra note 89, at 224.
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over the effectiveness of infringement control has, however, posed a
threat to international patent systems. 29 1 Recent restrictions im-
posed by members of the Budapest Treaty292 contravene the objec-
tives established during the origins of patent law.
The origins of patent law demonstrate a major objective for
devising a patent system-to encourage the dissemination of novel
ideas.293 In order to be considered patentable, an invention must
fulfill several requirements.294 A majority of industrialized coun-
tries maintain that certain living organisms can fulfill the require-
ments of utility, novelty, nonobviousness and enablement.295
Additionally, protection of the microorganisms through patents is
favored internationally.296
The patenting of microorganisms entails unique procedures.
Generally, inventors should use the best mode for disclosing inven-
tions to assure an effective patent system.297 The best mode for dis-
closing microorganism is the deposit of a viable sample.298
Individuals wishing to utilize the invention could reproduce it by
cultivating the microorganism under the appropriate conditions
enumerated in the patent application. 299 This procedure is clearly
more practical than an application consisting of only written
descriptions. 3"
The Budapest Treaty demonstrates the numerous problems in-
herent in the depositing of microorganisms."' The Treaty has elim-
inated much of the cost and confusion in the international
patenting of microorganisms.30 2 However, the Treaty contains sev-
eral shortcomings. For example, each member nation determines
which individuals may gain access to the samples in the deposita-
ries located within its boundaries. This rule has permitted Ger-
many to restrict total importation and exportation of its samples.30 3
Germany has valid arguments to support these restrictions.
291. See supra notes 238-69 and accompanying text.
292. Id.
293. See supra notes 18-29 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
300. Id.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 270-287.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 130-145.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 238-243.
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International availability of these samples makes infringement
more probable. 3" Furthermore, Germany is concerned that in-
fringement is a significant threat to international safety. 305 More-
over, Germany could cite the Paris Conventions' rules, allowing
Third World nations to restrict importation of technology, as inter-




The limitations imposed by Germany and Third World na-
tions will deter international publication of novel information.
Therefore, the Treaty must be amended in order to discourage Ger-
many and other nations concerned from passing restrictive laws.
The Budapest Treaty has been successful in many areas. This
agreement has encouraged cooperation between contracting na-
tions to provide uniform patent laws. A uniform system is neces-
sary to make international distribution of information
commonplace. Changes are necessary, however, so that the Treaty
is not rendered moot through the passage of restrictive laws by con-
tracting States. The problem is immediate, and the World Intellec-
tual Property Organization should call for a meaningful meeting to




306. See supra text accompanying notes 220-237.
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